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I. INTRODUCTION
Unbridled discretion of judges- in juvenile court or else-
where- can threaten individual liberties and public welfare.'
Zealous students of jurisprudence, offended by such corrup-
tion of the ideal, may imagine adoption of procedural and
substantive standards that would eliminate all discretion of
judges. Unfortunately, what optimally emerges from such
endeavors is merely a constructive "bridling" of the dangerous
enterprise.
This simple observation underlies a focused discussion on
the future of the juvenile court in the aftermath of calls from
academia for its abolition. The court has a rich heritage and
a future of promise that needs to be constructively envi-
sioned. Its critics will do well to get beyond fruitless talk of
sending all adolescent offenders into the criminal justice
system and instead move to a more productive vision.
Senior Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals.
'See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1. 18 (1967) ('Juvenile Court history has again dem-
onstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
poor substitute for principle and procedure."). Redundant references to -unbridled"
discretion have given the label a shopworn place in American legal literature. See
RICHARD A. POSNER. THE FEDERAL COURTS 147 (1996) (discussing law clerks' reliance
on such adjectives). It has been a mantra in commentaries on the Juvenile court
since it was employed by the United States Supreme Court in 1967. See Gault. 387
U.S. at 18. However trite, the phrase is useful to describe what might otherwise be
identified as the determination of rights according to the -arbitrary description of a
judge." 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE 9 (12th ed. 1877):
see id. at 15 (referring to the arbitrariness of -unbounded" judicial power). One Ju-
venile court critic offers a useable alternative, speaking of the 'limltless' discretion of
judges in determining delinquency dispositions. Janet E. Ainsworth. Re-imagining
Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing tle Juvenile
Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083. 1099 (1991).
2 As labels are always fashionable in the rhetoric of debate, the author's position
exemplifies that of a -conservationlst." See Adam D. Kamenstein. lThe InnerMorality
ofJuvenile Justice: The Case for Consistency and Legality. 18 CARDOZO L REV. 2105.
2146 (1997). It seemingly would follow that Kamenstein and others can be consid-
ered either "abolitionists" or "anti-conservationists." See generally Id. at 2108 n. 10
(discussing one critic's view of the abolitionist perspective).
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Among the many other remembrances being discussed in
1999, it seems appropriate to recognize that the twentieth
century is the juvenile court's lifespan. Throughout the dec-
ades, as policy-makers have attempted to shape the juvenile
justice system, some have wanted to abandon the effort.3 In
the political arena, abolition was suggested by those who
thought that individual rehabilitation efforts, shaped at the
discretion of juvenile judges, were too soft on crime.4 In the
last decade this same argument has cropped up repeatedly in
academic circles, largely because of the concern that judicial
discretion has permitted abuse of liberty interests of children
and families.5 Put simply, nearly all of these proposals boil
3 The proposition evidently was first published by a juvenile court practitioner in
1938. See Jesse Olney, The Juvenile Courts-Abolish Them, 13 CAL. ST. B.J. 1. 3, 6
(Apr.-May 1938) (expressing concerns both for the "star chamber" risk to juveniles
and the "loophole to the young criminals in their escape from punishment"). During
the last few decades, this view has appeared at least four other times in the litera-
ture of those publishing on the Issue. See Martin Guggenheim, A Call to Abolish the
Juvenile Justice System, 2 CHILDREN'S RrS. REP. No. 9, at 1 (ACLU/Juv. Rts. Project.
New York, N.Y.) June 1978, at 9 (describing a position reportedly retracted): Frances
B. McCarthy, Should Juvenile Delinquency Be Abolished?, 23 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
196, 196 (1977) ("Delinquency jurisdiction should be removed from the Juvenile
court and be allowed to revert to the criminal courts."); Irene Merker Rosenberg.
Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS.
L. REV. 163, 163-64 n.1, 174 n.66) (expressing the view that juvenile courts are "far
superior" to criminal courts); Stephen Wizner & Mary F. Keller, The Penal Model of
Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1120, 1121 (1977) ("It Is now commonly agreed that the juvenile court has
failed to achieve its objectives."); Marvin E. Wolfgang, Abolish the Juvenile Court Sys-
tem, 2 CAL. LAW. No. 10. 1982, at 12 (expressing the Isolated observation of Professor
Wolfgang, confined to the topic ofjurisdiction over chronic offenders).
Concerns about leniency of the courts have most commonly produced a call to
abolish the system. See Alex Elson, Juvenile Courts & Due Process, in JUSTICE FOR
THE CHILD, THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANSITION 95, 95-96 (Margaret K. Rosenhelm ed.,
1962) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD] (describing the abolitionist approach while
crediting judges and lawyers as authors of a more constructive approach). This con-
cem seldom has been stated in legal literature. See Olney. supra note 3 (expressing
concerns for both the "star chamber" risk to juveniles and the "loophole to the young
criminals in their escape from punishment"); see also Ainsworth, supra note 1, at
1084 n.4 (noting the policy view of a Reagan-era administrator of the Office of Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention). Nevertheless, it has been a force behind
the increasing number of the class of juvenile crimes handled in adult court. See
infra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Erik K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or
Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 372-73 (1998) (explaining the political law-and-order posi-
tion as a moving force behind the expanded waiver practice); Wayne A. Logan, Pro-
portionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 681, 689-93 (1998) (examining the punishment approach); Jennifer
M. O'Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Getting Smart about Getting Tougl Juvenile Justice
and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1299, 1305-09, 1311-
18, 1331-35 (1996) (surveying the "get tough" attitude toward juvenile corrections).
See Ainsworth, supra note 1, at 1101-18 (reviewing social and legal cause for
extension of rights to children, and foreseeing expanded rights to counsel and jury
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down to the preference for general laws over judicial discre-
tion, both on procedural rights and on sentencing.6
Elimination of the judicial role was first sought, success-
trial in criminal courts); Katherine Hunt Federle. The Abolition of the Juvenile Court:
A Proposalfor the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights. 16 J. CommP. L 23. 49-50
(1990) (sharing a speculative and overstated view of justice for children in the crimi-
nal justice system, where the author envisions. "the full panoply of protections both
constitutional and statutory." lawyers zealous for the child's rights. an impartial ju-
diciary, a tempered prosecutorial stance, and constitutional police behavior); see
generally infra note 6 (discussing Barry C. Feld's view); Olney. supra note 3 (com-
bining concerns for personal liberties and public safety).
6 In the crisp words of one proponent of abolition. "Ithe most appropriate place
for lawmaking is in the legislature and not the judiciary." Kamenstein. supra note 2.
at 2129. The same sentiment is evident in the body of juvenile court commentary
offered since 1978 by Professor Barry Feld of Minnesota. See Barry C. Feld. Bad
Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on Teen-Aged Axe-Afurderers. Judicial Activism.
and Legislative Default. 8 LAW & INEQ. J. 1. 3 (1989) (recommending 'legislation to
address the problems of sentencing serious young offenders"): Barry C. Feld. Refer-
ence of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking
Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515. 520. 572-85 (1978) [hereinafter Feld.
LegisLative Alternative] (discussing the "legislatively created waiver mechanism-).
Adam D. Kamenstein alludes to the adverse effects of discretion on children and
briefly notes the public concern for the weakening of criminal laws and for the integ-
rity ofjudicial action. Kamenstein, supra note 2. at 2132. 2136. 2143 (hypothesizing
about the possible negative effects on society that will take place when "the general
commands of law are weakened" and pointing out blatant inconsistencies in the ju-
venile prosecution and sentencing systems). These concerns are woven into a philo-
sophic concern for the "principle of legality" and the "internal-morality" of the justice
system. Id. at 2126-31, 2139-44 (defining the principle as "a rule of law., and state-
ment of the ideal").
Barry C. Feld's most recent abolitionist proposal is also built around concerns
about judicial discretion, which he suggests "fosters lawlessness" and may constitute
"a euphemism for idiosyncratic judicial subjectivity." Barry C. Feld. Abolish the Ju-
venile Court Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility. and Sentencing Policy. 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRMINOLOGY 68, 91 (1997) [hereinafter Feld, Abolish] (explaining how the
"individualized justice of a rehabilitative juvenile court... detracts from its utility as
a court of law"). "[A] more consistent sentencing policy" remains at the heart of
Feld's theses. Id. at 70. 115-23 (discussing his proposal "to formally recognize
youthfulness as a mitigating factor). Feld's earlier suggestions to abolish the court
are found in Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the
Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141 (1984) (discussing the general case for abolish-
ing the court); see also, Barry C. Feld. Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Seri-
ous Young Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal." 65 MINN. L REv. 167.
242 (1981) (finding "scant reason" and "little justification" for a separate system of
juvenile courts); Barry C. Feld. The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishment Treatment and the Dyference it Makes. 68 B.U. L REV. 821. 909-15
(1988) (finding the criminal justice system to be an adequate substitute for juvenile
courts): Feld, Legislative Alternative. supra, at 616 (addressing the Issue as to
whether the juvenile court can reconcile its "promise of rehabilitation with the rule of
law" as a yet "unanswered question").
Criticism of the juvenile courts frequently involves denouncing one court char-
acteristic such as the right to a jury trial absent in the juvenile courts of most states.
See Ainsworth, supra note 1. at 1126-30 (premising the call for abolition on absence
of jury trial right as well as inadequate court practices in extending children's con-
stitutionally guaranteed right to counsel).
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fully, through legislation limiting the power of a juvenile judge
to keep jurisdiction over certain dangerous offenders.7 But
zeal against discretion has not been confined to this limited
area of exception to juvenile court jurisdiction. Instead, there
persistently appears a group of observers, be they "abolition-
ists" or "anti-conservationists,"8 who call for eliminating juve-
nile court jurisdiction over public offenses and envision
prosecution of all children's offenses in the criminal justice
system.9
This article will critically examine the suggestion that the
juvenile courts be abolished, in part with reflection on his-
toric efforts to improve the offering of equity in human welfare
cases, to serve both individuals and the public's aim to pre-
vent greater disorder, while creating a jurisdiction that neces-
sarily enlarges the discretion of individual judges. Flaws In
equity jurisdiction, including those specific to juvenile courts,
are discussed, followed by a review of constructive corrections
of equity, including a statement of modem reforms that offers
hope for a genuinely helpful juvenile court that more consis-
tently lives within meaningful restraints under the rule of
law. The article concludes by examining the remarkably
flawed rationale offered for the proposition that juvenile of-
fenders should be prosecuted and sentenced like adults and
that judicial efforts to help adolescents rehabilitate their lives
ought to be eliminated. Finally, I restate the cause for stay-
ing the course for a court of equity that protects children and
society.
II. A HELPFUL JUDIcIAL RESPONSE To JUVENILE OFFENDERS
In the words of a nineteenth century English jurispru-
dence scholar,
[tihe law administered by the Lord Chancellor, or, In other
words, Equity, had in it originally an arbitrary or discretionary
element, but it in fact conferred real benefits upon the nation
and was felt to be in many respects superior to the common law
administered by the common-law Judges.
0
See John H. Wigmore, Juvenile Court v. Criminal Court, 21 ILL. L. REV. 375. 375-
77 (1926) (recognizing and praising the benefits of the juvenile court, while also
urging a balance in approaches so that the worst cases of Juvenile crime be handled
in adult court): see also, Klein, supra note 4, at 384-98 (comparing legislative waiver
with discretionary waiver by judges or prosecutors).
8 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing rhetoric employed in the
debate on the future of the juvenile court).
9 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.0 AV. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsTITrrUTION 376 (8th
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In resolving disputes under the rule of law, justice can be
fairly characterized as the correct determination of which ad-
versarial party is right and which is wrong. Typically, win-
ners and losers are identified. In contrast, equity considers
particular and compelling circumstances to determine a more
"substantial" or "entire" justice." On the one hand it renders
remedies more meaningful or complete, and on the other
hand it softens the effects of laws that may become uncon-
scionable or abusive in their application to an individual
case.1 2 Examining the exigent circumstances of an individual
case, the judge in equity, rather than merely naming winners
and losers, undertakes the more demanding task of problem
solving.
When equitable powers are devised for the special circum-
stances of human behavior, as occurs in the ever-expanding
fields of family law, juvenile justice, child protection, and in-
voluntary hospitalization, lawyers and judges, some of them
new to the role of problem-solver, confront the uniquely
daunting task of employing now-comprehensive bodies of law
in complex social situations. 3 This endeavor is toward the
laudatory end of accomplishing individualized justice- tak-
ing into account the personal circumstances of each individ-
ual who comes before the court in these matters.
4
The mission of the juvenile court, in a larger sense, was
ed. 1924) (1915).
1 See id.; STORY, supra note 1. at 10, 19 (describing how the decisions made ac-
cording to the discretion of judges in equity courts follow implicitly from the law): see
also BLACICS LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990) (Mhe object of [equityl is to render
the administration of justice more complete, by affording relief where the courts of
law are incompetent to give it... .".
12 See STORY, supra note 1. at 21-26 (describing how 'the modes of seeking and
granting relief in equity" are different from those in courts of law).
13 One juvenile court critic suggests that the theory of the system makes the court
a -de facto scientist and sociologist." Kamenstein. supra note 2. at 2112 (discussing
Parens Patriae).
14 See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPr OF LABOR. PUB. NO. 121. JtA7viILE-COURr
STANDARDS, 6 (1923) [hereinafter CHILDREN'S BUREAU. PUB. NO. 1211 (prescribing a
treatment role for the court "adapted to individual needs." with a presumption that
the child be kept at home "except when adequate investigation shows this not to be
in the best interest of the child"). One early commentator observed:
The usefulness of any human institution depends on the degree to which it is
socialized. The juvenile court movement represents to a remarkable extent the
way in which such an ancient legal institution as court procedure may be
animated by the spirit of humanism. Courts. for thousands of years. have
been rendering decisions, but until the juvenile court with its clinics, Its staff
of experts, doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers was estab-
lished no one ever traced the actual result of a court decision in terms of hu-
man values.
Miriam Van Waters, The Socialzation of Juvenlle Court Procedure. 13 J. A . INST.
CRmi. L. & CRINOLOGY 61, 61 (1922-23).
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cast in the preventive role of helping- rehabilitating-
youthful offenders.15 As justice is done to the individual,
value is delivered to society. The task represents, as one
criminologist observes, "the most important and ambitious
effort yet undertaken by our law to give practical expression
to the rehabilitative ideal."16
While its duration is relatively young, it is myopic to view
the juvenile court as a novel twentieth century legal experi-
ment. The roots of its mission and practice- and its tie to
the common law courts of equity17 - readily trace back to de-
velopments beginning many years earlier. 8 One clear example
of the court's longevity is its child-protective role- acting as
parens patriae-which has been part of Anglo-American law
for at least 300 years.' 9
1s See Van Waters, supra note 14, at 63-64 (discussing how rehabilitation re-
quires insight on the "biological uniqueness" and "social worth" of the child). Denver
Judge Ben Lindsey, at the turn of the century, insisted that "children are neither
good nor bad, but either strong or weak," therefore he saw in a delinquent boy "not a
criminal, not a bad boy, but merely a boy." BEN B. LINDSEY & HARVEY J. O'HICGINS,
THE BEASr 82, 134 (Robert E. Burke ed., 1970) (1910).
16 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; ESSAYS IN LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY 49 (1964).
17 See id. at 63 ("The legal basis of the Juvenile Court is rooted in equity.... So-
cialization of Juvenile Court Procedure depends on the clear, firm grasp of the prin-
ciples of equity."); CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUB. NO. 121, supra note 14, at 1 ("In chil-
dren's cases the proceeding should be chancery or equity, and not criminal, in
nature."). Equitable jurisdiction over personal welfare topics arises partly "from the
peculiar relation and personal character of the parties, who are the proper objects of
it" and partly "from a mixture of public and private trusts, of a large and interesting
nature." 2 STORY, supra note 1, at 575 (characterizing equity jurisdiction as that ex-
ercised over "the persons and property of infants, idiots, lunatics, and married
women").
18 See ALLEN, supra note 16, at 27 (reporting an early, even medieval, view of re-
habilitation as an element of justice); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An
Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187-1230 (1970) (discussing the
American history of juvenile court reform); id. at 1192-93 (noting the history the of
common response to child protection and juvenile justice, which are now viewed as
separate systems).
19 Because of its early history of conducting delinquency proceedings without due
process protections for the child, the juvenile court's parens patrae role has been
commonly miscast in the singular sense as a claim of unbridled authority. See, e.g..
Ainsworth, supra note 1, at 1098-99 (describing the "unprecedented expansion of
state social control over adolescents"). Fundamentally, parens patriae jurisdiction
signaled a high purpose as "protector" of those who have "no other lawful guardian,"
"as in the nature of trust," with a responsibility of "care" for the infant's person and
property. 2 STORY, supra note 1, at 576-78. Thus, the same role was the comer-
stone of court action in placing the custody of children in divorce proceedings and in
responding to evidence of the child's abuse or neglect. See id. at 589-90. The equity
court, acting as parens patriae, dealt essentially with "appointment and removal of
guardians." Id. at 585 (explaining the United States' historic placement of early Ju-
venile court jurisdiction with special courts which previously had jurisdiction over
estates and guardianships). In the juvenile court, parens patrae called for the Judi-
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IIl. TRIBULATIONS WITH EQUITY IN JUVENILE COURTS
The history of equity courts is littered with evidence of se-
vere flaws and harsh criticism.20 Thus, there has been abun-
dant censure of juvenile justice proceedings in this century,
often directed as well to the other modem court activities-
equity jurisdiction over divorce, child protection,
guardianship, and involuntary hospitalization- that were
chartered by legislative bodies to deal with complex human
welfare issues.2'
Modem attacks on the juvenile courts are not the fruit of
unprecedented insight, rather, they resemble complaints
voiced throughout the twentieth century that are rooted in
antiquity.22 Criticism has merely gained intensity as hopeful
reformers encountered obstacles in their attempt to instill the
constitutional restraints prescribed for the court by Kent and
Gault in 1966-67. 23
ciary to protect as well as the correct the children. See LINDSEY & O'HIOGGIS. supra
note 15, at 16; see also Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversanj Sys-
tem: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 7. 10 (noting the parens pa-
triae view that the child is seen "not as [ani enemy of society" but as "society's
child").
Parens patriaejurisdiction was observed in the common law courts as early as
1722. Kamenstein, supra note 2. at 2108 n. 11 (referring to the case of Eyre v.
Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722)).
See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
2! See id.
2 Fluctuations between discretion and the rule of law have occurred in "(all
legal history." CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'r OF HEALTH. EDUC. & WELFARE. PUB.
NO. 346-1954, SPECIALIZED COURTS DEALING WITH CHILDREN 2 n.5 (1954) [herein-
after CHILDREN'S BUREAU, SPECIALIZED COURTS] (quoting Roscoe Pound). A friend of
the juvenile courts noted in 1960:
[tIhe slings and arrows that came the way of the courts [in the 1950"sl seemed
not only more copious but sometimes harsher than ever before.... One
rather common characteristic was noticeable: there was a tendency to damn
the philosophy- the whole idea- because In so many courts it appeared to be
working imperfectly. All writers were heartily in favor of a fair trial for the Ju-
venile delinquent; few said anything about a fair trial for the juvenile court.
Paul W. Alexander, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court. n JUSTICE FOR THE
CHILD, supra note 4, at 82, 82. A 1965 survey of the courts reported that "practically
every significant aspect of the juvenile legal process is under heavy attack." Handler.
supra note 19, at 7; see also, Margaret K. Rosenheim. Perennial Problems in the Ju-
venile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD, supra note 4, at 1. 1-6 (observing that the
flaws of the court, from its beginnings. included its severity, lack of fair process. and
lack of resources). The problem, one observer explained, vras simply the creation of
power without legal protections. See ALLEN. supra note 16. at 54-56 (discussing the
bad results of inadequate theory and the necessity of fair and reliable procedures).
Criticism of the lack of constitutional processes is documented at least as early as
1914. See ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS. THE INVENTON OF DEUNQUENCY 158-
63 (1969) (noting the point of view of Edward Lindsey. one of the earliest skeptics of
thejuvenile court's humanitarian goals).
A march through juvenile court legal literature gives ample elaboration on the
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Problematically, equity may be permissive, too quick to re-
lieve its objects from strict application of the law. Often, eq-
uity courts abuse their intended beneficiaries under the guise
of mercy. It has been no different for the juvenile courts.
Much criticism of the juvenile justice system is well-founded
and should be underscored, especially with respect to the
persistent occurrence of abusive practices toward children
and families. A compelling case has been made for a better
juvenile court.
Briefly stated, the recurring abusive errors of the juvenile
court have been most evident in its practices of confining
children to institutions, usually for minor offenses,2 before
and after a determination of wrongdoing, and in taking ac-
tions like these without taking needed steps to get competent
counsel for the child. In addition, whether or not involving
residential care, dispositions have often been implemented
without valuable services for the child and his or her family.
Finally, juvenile court confinement abuses continue in the
face of evidence that they enlarge the likelihood of repeat of-
fenses and thus defy the preventive aims of the court.
impact of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); see, e.g., Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile
Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146 (1989); Irene Merker Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights
of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past. 27
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 656, 661-709 (1980) (discussing Gault extensively).
24 See United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) ("Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive of freedom
than any of man's other inventions."); JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN
64 (London, William Pickering 1847) (n.d.) (describing equity as "roguish," and no
more certain than the length of the Chancellor's foot); Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dis-
pensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 925, 926 (1960) (quoting Lord Camden in 1705) ('rhe discretion of a judge is
the law of tyrants.... In the best it is oftentimes caprice: in the worst it Is every
vice, folly and passion to which human nature is liable.").
Many of the most telling abuses in the juvenile courts have occurred in status
offense cases. See CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 341
(1978) (describing many courts' attitudes towards status offenders). An important
juvenile justice study shows court-ordered placements occurring in 30% of the cases
(5,277 of 17,195) handled by a state juvenile justice system, and 65% of these
placements (3,426 of 5,277) were ordered in misdemeanor and status offense cases,
many of which were often the first reported offense of the child. See Barry C. Feld,
Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in Juvenile Justice
Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 183-91 (1991) [hereinafter Feld,
Justice by Geography]. Another study of the related data indicates that over 40% of
the placements for minor offenses occurred in cases where the child was not repre-
sented by counsel. See Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An
Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1236-38 (1989).
26 Volumes of material document these criticisms, and it distracts from the sub-
ject of this article to delve deeply into this material. The author has recently re-
ported more completely on the topic in Gary L. Crippen, Can the Courts Fairly Ac-
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In sum, children have encountered both of the troubling
worlds observed by the United States Supreme Court in
1966, lack of procedural protections and lack of "solicitous
care."27 Unfortunately, these worlds are more disturbing than
imagined by the court three decades ago. Because of poor
court practices that invite waiver of procedural rights, these
rights are not enjoyed by children even when they are "guar-
anteed" by the rule of law.2 Moreover, patterns of a lack of
care offer a picture of a world where long episodes of invol-
untary confinement are often used as punishment for minor
acts of juvenile delinquency.
Given the examples of error in the juvenile court, it is in-
excusable to premise its future on the repetitive promise to be
helpful. Goodwill in the juvenile justice system, as in other
such public pursuits, does little to reduce the threat of its
abuses.29
In the words of Dean Roscoe Pound, a significant propo-
nent of the juvenile courtsY0
[c]hild placement involves administrative authority over one of
the most intimate and cherished of human relations. The pow-
ers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of
our juvenile courts and courts of domestic relations. The latter
may bring about a revolution as easily as did the former. It is
well known that too often the placing of a child in a home or even
in an institution is done casually or perfunctorily or even arbi-
trarily. Moreover effective preventive work through these courts
requires looking into much more than the bad external condi-
tions of a household, such as poverty or neglect or lack of disci-
countfor the Diminished Competence and Culpability of Juveniles? A Judge's Perspec-
tive, in COMPETENCE AND CULPABILITY OF ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS (Thomas Grisso &
Robert Schwartz eds., forthcoming Dec. 1999) (on file with the University of Pennsyl-
vania Journal of Constitutional Law) [hereinafter Crippen. A Judge's Perspective].
27 Kent, 383 U.S. at 556 '[mhe child ... neither gets the protections accorded to
adults nor the... regenerative treatment postulated for children.-).
28 See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER. JUVENILE LAW CENTER. AND YOUTH LAW
CENTER, A CALL FOR JUSICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF AccESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 44-45 (1995) (discussing the presence
of arents in juvenile cases where counsel is walved).
See WILLARD GAYLIN Er AL., DOING GOOD. THE LMIs OF BENEVOLENCE 67-168
(1978) (portraying abuses of process and substance in unconstrained public service
prqgrams)-
P'Pound consistently praised the juvenile court movement and system. See Paul
W. Alexander, A BriefReintroduction to the Juvenile Court. 50 ABA J. 353. 353 (1964)
(quoting Pound). These courts. Pound wrote, had done more -for intelligent handling
of crucial conditions of delinquency and organization and operation of tribunals
adapted to preventive justice in metropolitan areas than had been brought about in
two preceding centuries of American Law." Roscoe Pound. Tie Challenge of the Ju-
venile Court, in NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N. 1950 YEARBOOK 38 (now National
Council on Crime and Delinquency).
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pline. Internal conditions, a complex of habits, attitudes, and
reactions, may have to be dealt with and this means administra-
tive treatment of the most intimate affairs of life. Even with the
most superior personnel, these tribunals call for legal checks.3'
This individualized justice system has vital personal liber-
ties in its hands and often abuses the trust bestowed upon it.
Thus, it would be a mistake to rely on the persistently
euphemistic treatment rhetoric of the juvenile justice system.
A classic warning on the subject comes from C. S. Lewis, the
late English scholar, writing approximately fifty years ago:
[iut may be said that... Humanitarians... are not punishing,
not inflicting, only healing. But do not let us be deceived by a
name. To be taken without consent from my home and friends;
to lose my liberty; to undergo all those assaults on my personal-
ity which modem psychotherapy knows how to deliver; to be re-
made after some pattern of 'normality' hatched in a Viennese
laboratory to which I never professed allegiance; to know that
this process will never end until either my captors have suc-
ceeded or I grown [sic] wise enough to cheat them with apparent
success-who cares whether this is called Punishment or not?
That it includes most of the elements for which any punishment
is feared- shame, exile, bondage, and years eaten by the lo-
cust- is obvious.... Mercy, detached from justice, grows un-
merciful. That is the important paradox. ... [WIe ought long
ago to have learned our lesson. We should be too old now to be
deceived by those human pretensions which have served to
usher in every cruelty of the revolutionary period in which we
live.
32
Placements are institutional confinement. Pre-hearing de-
tention may be considered jailing or its equivalent. By any
name, these remedies rightfully can not be chosen by a judi-
cial authority that is free of significant legal restraints.
IV. THE TRADITION OF HARNESSING EQUITY- AND A CuRRENT
AGENDA
A century ago, Justice Story wrote that "equity must have
31 Roscoe Pound, Foreword to First Edition. in PAULINE V. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT
IN PROBATION & DELINQUENCY at xv (2d. ed. 1969) (1937).
32 C. S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment (1953), reprinted In CS.
LEWIS, GOD IN THE DOCK: ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS 287, 290-94 (walter
Hooper ed., 1970): see ALLEN, supra note 16, at 18 (corroborating Lewis' view, ob-
serving that doing something for someone is also to do something to that person:
and thus disputing the rigid distinction between rights in a criminal proceeding and
a juvenile proceeding); see also Alexander W. Pisciotta, Saving the Children: The
Promise and Practice of Parens Patriae, 1838-98, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 410-25 (1982)
(reviewing 19th Century failings of benevolence, especially in institutions and sup-
porting a skeptical view of humanitarian rhetoric).
[Vol. 2:1
THE JUVENILE COURTS NEXT CENTVRY
a place in every rational system of jurisprudence.' This
same observation is even more significant in the context of a
helping role for juvenile courts and family courts of the twen-
tieth century.' The blending of equity and the rule of law,
employing judicial discretion while at the same time bridling
it, is a rich tradition in the historic effort to refine and pre-
serve equity jurisdiction. 5 In the common law, jurists re-
flected with satisfaction on the ultimate capacity of equity to
reach, as Dean Pound later would state more succinctly, "a
reasoned decision in the light of principles.'
1 STORY, supra note 1, at 6 (explaining that "[elvery system of laws must neces-
sarily be defective, and cases must occur, to which the antecedent rules cannot be
ap lied without injustice, or to which they cannot be applied at all').
This helping role is described in the following manner.
In recognizing the importance of maintaining a balance between Individualiza-
tion and the protection of legal rights, any suggestion must be avoided of a
return to a mechanized, routine application of an "automatic" justice. which
would be no justice at all and which would deny one of the most vital func-
tions of a specialized court- that of giving the authoritative support needed to
assure to all children the help, the care, and the treatment they need.
CHILDREN'S BUREAU. SPECIALZED COURTS, supra note 22, at 4 (stating juvenile court
philosophy). In this spirit, the Bureau prescribed certain principles to "be recognized
as an essential part of individualized justice by all coming into contact with the
court," including standards on intervention, notice, hearings. appeals, and disposi-
tional limits. Id. at 6-7. In the colorful language of Judge Ben Lindsey of Denver.
treating children as adults maimed young lives "by trying to make the gristle of their
unformed characters carry the weight of our iron laws and heavy penalties." LIUDSEY
& O'HIGGINS, supra note 15, at 83.
35 See KENNETH C. DAVIS. ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw TEXT 16 (3d ed. 1972) (discussing
the unpredictability of the "rule of law" due to a blend of decision-making consisting
of decisions made at times "without any principles" and at others. "by the application
of known principles or laws"). Davis and Roscoe Pound remain two of America's
foremost students of discretionary powers. On the same subject. Pound wrote: "All
legal experience shows that the power of adjusting the operation of legal precepts to
the exigencies of special circumstances is unavoidable if there is to be a complete
system ofjustice according to the law." Pound, supra note 24. at 936-37. Ultimately
Pound concluded. that the "security of the individual life requires equality, a balance
of uniformity and predictability with adaptation to the exigencies of the individual
life." Id. at 925. The promotion of this balance, Pound concluded. "is a standing
problem of the science of law." Id. at 937. The "attempt to reduce all things to [a]
rule in the nineteenth century" made "manifest" to Pound that there uwas a real need
for discretion in the administration of justice. Roscoe Pound. Justice According to
Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696. 705 (1913).
Morris R. Cohen, also writing early in this century, concluded that. just as he
foresaw anarchy if individual conscience were sovereign, the law "must also recog-
nize that individual conscience may be a much more delicate instrument for moral
apprehension, so that to suppress it is to bar the way for more enlightened justice."
Morris R. Cohen, Positivism and the limits of Idealism In the Law. 27 COLUM. L REV.
237, 249 (1927); see also STORY, supra note 1. at 8-14 (discussing how equity courts
are still bound by the principles of justice as formulated in courts of law).
Pound, supra note 24, at 927. The Englishman A.V. Dicey observed in the
nineteenth century that "it was obvious that Equity was developing into a judicial
system for the application of principles which, though different from those of the
common law, were not less fixed." DICEY, supra note 10. at 376: see also Gee v. Prit-
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In the juvenile justice system, a balancing of general law
and discretion is partly embodied as an exercise in moderat-
ing calls for punishment with the preventive task of rehabili-
tating the offender. In the struggle to achieve this balance
there is no greater argument for unconditional mercy than
there is for rigid imposition of punishment. 7 It is however,
imperative that the good will of the court be harnessed by fair
process and restraints against unnecessary deprivations of
personal liberty.
It is evident in reflections on the history of equity that one
is in very good company when resisting efforts either to abol-
ish the juvenile courts or to perpetuate their past mistakes;
ultimately though, both positions are apt to be simplistic and
untenable. In contrast to these viewpoints, the Anglo-
American legal tradition suggests a more thoughtful, vigorous
struggle to restrain the helpful, preventive, rehabilitative work
of these courts- the notion of equity- with rules of law that
tend to reduce the danger that agents of the court do too
much or too little. The goal is benevolence with restraint as
an alternative to abolition of benevolence. Like democracy it-
self, equity and its offshoots are grievously flawed but better
than any other approach we know.
No doubt, it is an awesome task to translate these general
principles of jurisprudence into specific reform proposals.
The juvenile justice system is an exceedingly complex enter-
prise, involving not only the rubrics of a specialized judicial
agency but the workings of supporting social agencies. 3 The
chard, 2 Swanston 402, 414, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818) ("The doctrines of the Court
ought to be as well settled, and made as uniform almost as those of the common law,
laying down fixed principles, but taking care that they are to be applied according to
the circumstances of each case.").
37 See CHARLES LARSEN, THE GOOD FIGHT, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BEN B. LINDSEY 49
(1972) (describing how Judge Lindsey anticipated the dangers of an excess of either
punishment or kindness). This balancing of punishment and rehabilitation, some
observers insist, is not an "internal inconsistency," but a "compromise," a "duality"
that is needed to be effective. O'Connor & Treat, supra note 4, at 1300-01. The
court recognized early on that this duality required application of standards. One
observer lamented, "heaven forbid any increase in socialization" if this meant that
standards were ignored regarding the investigation and presentation of evidence of
individual circumstances in a case (using assumptions rather than facts) or If "fears
and prejudices" were permitted to govern decisions. Van Waters, supra note 14. at
65; see also Handler, supra note 19, at 12-45 (prescribing standards including an
early proposal for a non-waivable right of counsel while recognizing the threat that a
child might rightfully consider the offer of "help" as a signal of danger).
38 "The juvenile court, both in theory and practice, is an institution of remarkable
complexity." ALLEN, supra note 16, at 44, 49 (quoting a juvenile judge for the view
that "[ljuvenile courts are the least understood and most misunderstood of the
courts of our land"); Fox, supra note 18, at 1239 ("[The path of reform Is a matter of
complex social and psychological problems that must be confronted before proce-
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entire enterprise must be aimed at dealing effectively with the
individual circumstances of an adolescent offender and his or
her family. Nevertheless, the same complexities that make
reform a daunting task equally suggest the likelihood of seri-
ous flaws in any rationale that proposes to simply abolish ju-
venile justice as we know it. As I will observe more particu-
larly, these lapses are evident in the published proposals for
abolition of the juvenile court.
The unrelenting efforts in recent decades to improve jus-
tice in the juvenile courts have made possible the identifica-
tion of a positive agenda for reform, with many of its particu-
lars now in place in a number of states. First, fair process
requires a meaningful guarantee of the right to counsel,
which, in turn, is a reform that should consist of three ingre-
dients. The right must be non-waivable for any child in pro-
ceedings where the court may place the child in a residential
facility. Deliberate efforts, probably through a public de-
fender system, must substantially increase the quality of rep-
resentation available. Likewise, quality services of counsel
are needed for appeals from delinquency proceedings.'
Second, and in this instance regarding the substance of
the court's work, essential reforms must include effective dis-
positional standards, here also in three parts. The rubrics
must be carefully crafted to directly confront the juvenile
court pattern of ill-considered, unsuitable, unnecessary, and
often discriminatory confinement of adolescents in residential
facilities. Thus, the target of these standards must be the
pretended efforts of rehabilitation that are in fact singularly
retributive.' Furthermore, the standards must be backed by
a mandate for relevant trial court findings of fact. In addi-
tion, the mandate for appropriate findings must be upheld by
an effective right of appeal.
dural change can be truly accomplished.").
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260.155(2)(b)(2) (1998): MINN. STAT. § 611.25(lI(3) (1998)
(extending the services of state public defender to delinquency appeals): MI r . R.
JUV. P. 3.02(3) (1998) (providing non-waivable counsel for any case "in which out-of-
home placement is proposed"): MINN. R. Juv. P. 3.04(l) (1998) (prescribing conditions
for the lawful waiver of counsel): see also Crippen. A Judge's Perspectize. supra note
26 (reporting historic scarcity of juvenile court appeals and effects of reform in Min-
nesota since 1995).
40 See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. § 260.185(1) (1998) (stating mandate for trial court find-
ings of fact); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) (stating due process demands -careful
inquiry and judgment" with respect to the possibility of disposition without place-
ment); In re Welfare of C-.W., 579 N.W.2d 494. 497-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (enu-
merating elements of Rule 15.05 and its companion statute); MINN. R. JUV. P.
15.05(2)(A) (1998) (stating mandate for trial court findings of fact): MINr. R. JUV. P.
15.05(2)(B)(2) (1998) (unique supreme court rule enunciating standards of propor-
tionality, need-based cause for placement, and placement suitability for individual).
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Other necessary reforms include (a) mandates for appro-
priate dispositional hearings in all cases, including reviews of
prior dispositions, (b) upgraded advisory practices as a con-
dition to any waiver of the right to an adjudicatory hearing,
(c) reduction of pre-hearing detention through development of
assessment standards and program alternatives, (d) expe-
dited appeal proceedings in any case where a child placement
has been ordered, and (e) an extension to children of the
same right as adults to have disputed charges determined by
a jury. Court management of resources, independent of the
challenge to develop them, is also a vital target of reform. 2 As
with any court, the mission requires a thoughtful quest for
able and interested judges who have the time and resources
for the unique and demanding task 3
41 See MINN. R. JUV. P. 5.03 (stating presumption for unconditional pre-hearing
release, with rebuttal permitted only upon showing that the child is dangerous, in
need of protection, or apt to abscond); MINN. R. JUV. P. 8.04(1) (1998) (stating helpful
advisory list of rights for juvenile cases); MINN. R. JUV. P. 15.04, 15.07, 15.08 (1998)
(mandating hearings on original and modified dispositions, including probation vio-
lation responses); Melton, supra note 23, at 168-77 (observing notable rehabilitative
effect in up-front respect for due process protections); see also Bart Lubow & Joseph
B. Tulman, The Unnecessary Detention of Children in the District of Columbla. 3 D.C.
L. REV. ix (1995) (discussing comprehensive urban detention reforms, and high-
lighting the need for alternative resources and objective risk assessments).
Some observers of the juvenile court especially covet the child's right to a Jury
trial, which is not available in the juvenile courts of three-fourths of the states. See
Ainsworth, supra note 1, at 1121-26 (discussing availability of jury trials). The right
to a jury trial in juvenile court has dubious value for children, especially when con-
sidering the predominance of minor cases and the prospect for enlarged jury trial
rights in the handling of misdemeanors in the criminal courts. See Crippen, A
Judge's Perspective, supra note 26 (reviewing the limited cause to abolish the juvenile
courts in the quest for jury trials).
42 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966) (citing the shortage of
resources as a shortcoming of the juvenile courts). Much of the problem of resources
will be remedied by courts that take responsibility for management/accountability of
the system. See GARY CRIPPEN, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF YOUTH POL., MAKING THE
SYSTEM WORK: COURTS AS AGENTS OF ACCOUNTABILrTY IN FAMILY AND JUVENILE CASES
15-21 (1993) (discussing judges' and lawyers' involvement in securing the delivery of
social services); see also James C. Howell, Abolish the Juvenile Court? Nonsense, 4
JUV. JUST. UPDATE I (Feb.-Mar. 1998) (explaining how the effectiveness of the Juve-
nile court is enhanced when the court Is better integrated with other human service
systems).
43 The contributions and shortcomings of specialized judges have not been ade-
quately researched and reported. As a result, there Is no occasion for an objective
recommendation for designation of specialists or generalists to do the work of Juve-
nile justice.
When juvenile court jurisdiction is handled by generalists, there Is a tendency
to worsen the chances for justice by failing to administer the caseload so that one
judge deals with a case at all Its stages. This is a severe mistake.
Furthermore, while all judicial systems face the peril of providing too little judi-
cial service, which translates into a demand that cases be handled too quickly, the
risks of error in hurrying cases are especially great in dealing with the unique chal-
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V. THE FLAWED RATIONALE FOR ABANDONING JUVENILE JUSTICE
This discussion of prospective reform, both in theory and
in proposals for better "bridling" of the juvenile justice sys-
tem, ends with a final, critical question. Has some compel-
ling case been made for giving up the effort, for simply prose-
cuting all childhood offenses in the criminal courts? An
examination of the calls for abolishing the juvenile court
shows surprising flaws, making the proposition premature if
not ultimately untenable.
A. Hopelessness
The most common hypothesis for abolition is largely un-
stated, but it is rooted in the false assumption that aban-
donment of the juvenile justice system is a logical response to
the recitation of its problems. The successful identification of
specific reforms, however, challenges the "anti-
conservationists" to show not only the past failings of the
system but also to show that (a) identified reforms are either
unworkable or actually unattainable, and (b) the aims of ju-
venile justice can be achieved in the criminal courts.'
More deliberate statements of cause to abolish the juvenile
courts have now appeared. A discussion of this literature is
begun with reference to a pair of propositions that question
the worth of a rehabilitative approach with adolescent offend-
ers.
B. Treatment v. Punishment
Proponents of abolition have discounted the value of juve-
nile justice system efforts to treat or rehabilitate children,
suggesting that society abandon corrections developments of
this kind that have unfolded over centuries." Slighting the
burden to show that treatment efforts are futile, these critics
largely have rested their hypotheses on the notion that de-
fenders of the rehabilitation effort have not proven its worth .
lenges of the juvenile court and other personal-welfare courts. Remarkaby vgorous
efforts are needed to provide judges and other staff an adequate quantity of time to
deal properly with cases coming before these courts.
4 See Crippen, A Judge's Perspective. supra note 26 (discussing and evaluating
both reform proposals and the abolitionists' burden of proof.
45 See supra notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text (discussing origins of Juve-
nile court rehabilitation alms).
"See Kamenstein, supra note 2, at 2144 (-Evidence does not support the conclu-
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Significantly, in their occasional attempts to illustrate
failed rehabilitation efforts, critics cite mostly studies on the
adverse affects of institutional care. Unwittingly, they em-
ploy this evidence as a prelude to the proposition that juve-
niles should be prosecuted in the criminal justice system,
where institutional remedies are a hallmark.48  Use of this
evidence is problematic because it overlooks 70% of juvenile
court dispositions, namely those that do not employ an in-
stitutional placement. 49  Finally, these critical observations
are premised on a deficient look at literature, disregarding
numerous studies that demonstrate the effectiveness of
treatment approaches, including those that utilize well-
conceived institutional programs.
One deficiency is obvious in the utilization of definitions of
'childhood' as developed early in this century. These defini-
tions do not account for many mature and dangerous young
offenders, who are candidates for a retributive approach. It Is
too easily overlooked that the juvenile justice system can and
sion that current treatment has any substantial effect on altering or 'curing' the be-
havior of juvenile delinquents.").
47 See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV.
691, 703 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation] (citing controversy over the fruits
of rehabilitative programs and noting that "[tihe general conclusion that 'nothing
works' in juvenile or adult corrections has not been persuasively refuted").
48 Feld employs his analysis of medical and social science to suggest, without ref-
erences, that juvenile court dispositions are utterly irrational in light of the absence
of "scientific bases" to permit a judge to predict that a treatment program will be ef-
fective for an individual child. Feld, Abolish, supra note 6, at 91-92.
49 Feld most recently has avoided the pitfall of using institutional statistics to sug-
gest overall failure of treatment efforts; at the same time, his analysis of treatment
programs tends to go no further, omitting discussion of evidence on rehabilitative
steps that do not involve institutional care. See Feld, Abolish, supra note 6, at 84-
85. He contends that evaluations of residential programs "belie" the fact that such
proirams have any therapeutic purpose. See id.
Although account for the point is confined to the end of a footnote, Feld now
acknowledges the significance of some evidence on the value of treatment efforts,
citing much of it. See id. at 85-86 n.34; see also Howell, supra note 42, at 10 (citing
studies showing the effectiveness of probation and other treatment efforts in reduc-
ing recidivism, especially in early intervention, including responses to serious offend-
ers and efforts with youths assessed as risks for serious crime). Other studies ad-
dress the value of well-designed residential programs. See JAMES F. AUSTIN & BARRY
KRISBERG, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 142-70 (1993) (discussing the "Massachu-
setts experiment"); MICHAEL A. JONES & BARRY KRISBERG, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME
& DELINQ., IMAGES AND REALITY: JUVENILE CRIME, YOUTm VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
36-40 (1994) (discussing what methods work with serious offenders): O'Connor &
Treat, supra note 4, at 1318-30, 1336-40 (discussing juvenile correctional facilities
as alternatives to waiver and methods of reform). Dispositional efforts in a rehabili-
tative approach can include an array of promising choices that do not employ resi-
dential placement. See, e.g., Cynthia Conward, The Juvenile Justice System: Not
Necessarily in the Best Interests of Children, 33 NEw ENG. L. REV. 39, 70-77 (1998)
(discussing alternatives to placement).
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does succeed with the great majority of adolescent offenders
without the threat of punishment." However challenging the
effort to identify the treatable child, the courts- significantly,
like parents- have ample reason to expect that most juve-
niles can be corrected without putting them in jail or threat-
ening to do so.52 The worst results in dealing with adolescent
offenders have occurred as products of putting juveniles in
severe confinement.'
C. General Economic Reform?
Criticism of the rehabilitative aim includes the added
contention that a helping, case-by-case approach is a poor
substitute for "social structural change" and may serve as an
"alibi" to avoid fundamental steps of "supporting families.
communities, schools, and social institutions" to meet the
needs of youth .4 This entirely political analysis, in many re-
spects a futile cry for the moon, takes no account of the sig-
nificant contribution of the juvenile justice system, which
may be, in its early and determined dealings with young of-
fenders, one of society's most valuable public programs for
prevention of crime and other social disorder. Moreover, be-
cause belief in the leniency of the juvenile courts is one of the
primary political sentiments that is brought to bear against
the juvenile courts, it is difficult to imagine the political envi-
ronment that would abolish the courts and, in the next
breath, adopt sweeping social reforms that benefit children.s
To further a discussion of the cases made for abolition,
51 See ALLEN, supra note 16. at 57 (explaining that the gains for children made
possible through the rehabilitative approach -demand acknowledgment In any ap-
praisal of the court and its work"); see also O'Connor & Treat. supra note 4. at 1333
(-There is a striking consensus among researchers. jurists. and law enforcement offi-
cials about what kinds of programs are proven to reduce recidivism and to rehabili-
tate juveniles.).
Any parent can appreciate the significance of original Juvenile court aims to aid
the "civilizing forces," including home and school. in helping children, and thus. by
doing so, also "protect society by making the children good members of society."
LINDSEY & O'HIGGINS. supra note 15, at 135: see Id. at 133-52 (discussing initial tac-
tics of ajudge in a court of this kind).
See, e.g., Feld, Abolish, supra note 6. at 85-86 n.34 (discussing generally nega-
tive effects of confinement).
Id. at 95; see f&L at 93-95. 134-36 (describing the failure of the Juvenile court
system as one of conception because it attempts to combine efforts to control crimi-
nals with social welfare goals).
55 The pursuit of individualized justice in the Juvenile courts is not at odds with
major social reforms. See NICHOLAS LEMANN. THE PROMISED LAND 120-29 (1991) (de-
scribing how during the 1960's. activists in the Juvenfle Justice system had a notable
part in producing one of the most substantial packages of social reforms In American
history).
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attention will be given to five theses suggesting that juvenile
court injustices are inherent in its rehabilitative aims, mak-
ing it imperative to abandon the system in favor of adult
court jurisdiction over children's cases.
1. Soft on Crime?
Do juvenile court dispositions weaken the law enforcement
effort, threatening public safety Tm The case on leniency of
the juvenile court has not been established. The claim Is es-
pecially suspect at the end of this century, following two dec-
ades of escalating legislation to permit punitive dispositions
and to provide for adult sentences for serious juvenile crimes.
The absence of evidence suggesting a problem of leniency ex-
plains the sparse reference to the point in legal literature and
also undermines the credibility of propositions for abolition
that merely assume the problem. The suspicion of leniency
is fed by political rhetoric regarding juvenile arrests, much of
which has involved careless exaggeration.m In addition, there
is ample reason to seriously doubt the significance of crime-
rate reports based on arrest records, a fact that should signal
caution to the wary. 9
Finally, a plea for severity is evidently premised, in the po-
litical arena, on revelations of unusually violent offenses by
some young people. Whatever merit may exist for this posi-
tion, the argument carries no weight for the cause of abol-
ishing the juvenile courts because cases of this kind are
rarely encountered. In fact, over 80% of all juvenile cases in-
volve accusations of a misdemeanor or a status offense,
mostly by children who are under 15 years of age.6° It is
within this arena that the juvenile courts serve their funda-
mental preventive purpose in dealing with these adolescent
See supra note 4 (discussing the political call for abolishing the juvenile courts,
which is uncommonly advocated in legal literature).
S7 Kamenstein uses the point in argument, asserting a "negative effect on society-
at-large" but rests on the notion that this effect occurs when the courts weaken the
enforcement effort, without ever addressing the evidence regarding occurrence of any
such pattern of weakening. Kamenstein, supra note 2. at 2132.
s8 See Howell, supra note 42, at 1, 2, 10 (discussing how some abolitionists are
acting on erroneous information regarding the effectiveness of the juvenile courts):
see also Conward, supra note 50, at 46-48 (discussing misconstruction of statistics
and media distortions of evidence).
59 For example, Feld's reports on empirical evidence include the remarkable
showing that juvenile felony petitions were filed for only 18.6% of reported FBI Part I
felony arrests for juveniles ages 10 to 17. Feld, Justice by Geography, supra note 25,
at 177.
60 See id. at 183 & 172-83 (discussing statistics of age, offense, and prior refer-
rals).
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'delinquencies'.
2. Retribution by Another Name?
As the question as to whether the juvenile courts are too
lenient is still pending, we are confronted with a crucial
question: can a case for abolition safely be rested on the
proposition that the court's dispositions are too severe, while
at the same time these very dispositions are hiding a pattern
of punishment (and abhorrent racial discrimination') under a
veneer of concern for treating the adolescent offender?'
Here, the proponents of abolition have evidence that demon-
strates a severe problem,63 instead of using their knowledge to
address their concerns, they misuse this information to reach
an unjustified conclusion.
The proven error of severity is in the abusive use of resi-
dential placements. Interestingly, however, approximately
70% of the uvenile justice system caseload does not involve a
placement. So we're left with the inevitable question: what
will criminal court jurisdiction correct- the problems of the
30%, those of the others, or the selection of the cases which
do not need a placement? Unfortunately, this question has
barely entered into the literature addressing the abolition of
juvenile courts.
For the 70% left in their homes by the juvenile courts,
what should they anticipate in a criminal court? Is this a
court that will be equally cautious about public safety de-
mands, especially in the environment following a legislative
choice, no doubt prompted by advocates of law and order, to
abolish the juvenile court?
How about the other 30% who require placement? Will
they get less severe treatment in the adult courts? Perhaps
under certain suggested youth sentencing schemes they may
61 See Feld, Abolish, supra note 6. at 84.
62 This suggestion rests partly on the notion that most states to some extent have
abandoned their pursuit of rehabilitation in the juvenile courts in favor of express
aims to serve public safety interests. See, e.g., Id. at 74-86. But this proposition is
overstated. See Crippen, A Judge's Perspective. supra note 26 (citing the prevalence
of statutes aimed at protecting the rehabilitative alms of the juvenile courts): Linda
F. Giardino, Statutory Rhetoric: The Realily Behind Juvenile Justice Policies in Amer-
tca, 5 J.L. & POLY 223, 234-35 (1996) (discussing the 1980 supplementation of Min-
nesota's "exclusively benevolent and rehabilitative" statutes with "competing goals of
maintaining the integrity of the substantive criminal law").
63 See, e.g., Feld, Justice by Geography, supra note 25. at 189 (reporting a study of
Minnesota data showing a statewide placement rate of 29.6% and variations for ur-
ban, suburban, and rural jurisdictions).
64 See Feld, Abolish, supra note 6. at 91-92.
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expect confinement for shorter terms.6 But what facilities
will be employed? More particularly, will they involve some-
thing better than jails and their attendant problems of recidi-
vism?' Will these sentencing schemes be tolerable enough to
permit plea bargains and stayed sentences that provide for
longer confinement in other facilities- some of them equally
oppressive but more benignly portrayed and perceived? With-
out fully exploring these hazards it would be premature to opt
for criminal court jurisdiction.
Finally, how will the criminal courts sort out the 70% from
the whole, in order to spare this majority from confinement?
Of course, these judicial decisions are discretionary, yet at
the same time they beg for control. These dispositions look
for guidance through sentencing standards, a mandate for
findings of fact, and a meaningful right of appeal. While
these reform practices are not characteristic of the criminal
justice system, they can be provided in juvenile court. Un-
fortunately, the anti-conservationists place these decisions in
the hands of judges who are not faced with the challenge of
the juvenile court to understand young people and the best
approaches for dealing with them.
3. The Plea for Certainty
Whether the rehabilitation standard is predominantly se-
vere or lenient, two authors who propose abolishing the juve-
nile courts rest their cases heavily on the need for certainty, a
plea not substantially different than countless other historic
indictments of equity. 7 These critics advance the argument
See fi. at 96-121 (resting his abolition thesis on a sentencing scheme with dis-
counts for youth).
Feld suggests that adolescents should not be confined in adult Jails or 'punk
prison,' but in age-segregated "correctional facilities." Barry C. Feld, Crimlnallzlng
the American Juvenile Court, 17 CRIME & JUST. 197, 255 (1993). As Feld acknowl-
edges, the plea for new capital resources is not a likely avenue for reform in dealings
with adolescent offenders. Id. at 256. This suggestion for resources must come be-
fore the same legislative authorities who are electing to abolish the juvenile courts
(most likely due to concerns confined to public safety). See Robert 0. Dawson. The
Future of Juvenile Justice: Is it Time to Abolish the System?, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 136, 141-42, 148-49, 155 (1990) (observing that resource Investment
depends to some extent on preserving a separate juvenile court).
Kamenstein pleads for a "principle of legality" and an "inner-morality of law," so
that adolescents have notice of the substance of the law and the Judiciary has "integ-
rity." Kamenstein, supra note 2, at 2126-31; see id. at 2131-44 (indicting the Juve-
nile court for offending these principles).
Feld suggests that public policy should take age into account for a sentencing
discount, but that considering any other factors in a disposition is too subjective to
be rational or fair. See Feld, Abolish, supra note 6, at 91-92, 121-25 (discussing how
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beyond a matter of theory, arguing that uncertainty in the
courts' goals has the practical consequence of mis-shaping
youthful offenders.6 Without certainty, one critic suggests. a
young person will not sense blame, learn right from wrong, or
"consider himself having been dealt with justly." 9
Suggestions for certainty have a rightful place in theoreti-
cal discussions of judicial discretion, but there is no prece-
dent to support the purist notion of a certain rule of law.
That uncertainty is sensed by adolescents in juvenile court,
that this has an ill effect on them, or that they would be bet-
ter educated and impressed by a criminal court is mere
speculation; the notion is in fact flatly contradicted by evi-
dence that severe institutional dispositions have failed to re-
habilitate young offenders.70 Some critics come very close to
the indefensible proposition that jailing kids is good for them
and creates the kinds of attitudes and insight that society
wants them to have.
Finally, evidence on the effectiveness of treatment, as dis-
cussed earlier, belies the theoretical concern for promoting a
class of lawless youth. This evidence also eliminates another
exaggerated problem of uncertainty, the added assertion that
rehabilitation decisions are irrational because there are no
scientific means to choose effective treatment programs.7 '
the introduction of subjective elements into the explanations of juvenile behavior ,-ill
undermine the objectivity of the law). Both Kamenstein and Feld find an advantage
of certainty in simply eliminating the question of whether a child will be prosecuted
in the juvenile court or adult court. See Feld. Abolish. supra note 6. at 127 (dis-
cussing the benefits of an integrated court system): Kamenstein. supra note 2. at
2135-37.
The pursuit of a theory of certainty has already produced questionable results
related to the topic of juvenile offenders. Legislative transfer of cases to adult court
has led to demonstrably arbitrary actions. See Richard E. Redding. Juveniles Trans-
ferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform Proposals Based on Social Science Research.
1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 741-42 (1997) (discussing these 'subjective and inconsis-
tent" results); see also Conward, supra note 50. at 49 (citing evidence on the short-
comings of Florida's automatic waiver approach); O'Connor & Treat. supra note 4. at
1314-18. 1335 (reviewing criticism of current waiver practice).
8 See infra notes 69, 71 and accompanying tex.L
Kamenstein, supra note 2. at 2134-35. Feld agrees. suggesting that i[bly de-
nying youths' personal responsibility, juvenile courts' treatment Ideology reduces of-
fenders' duty to exercise self-control, erodes their obligation to change. and sustains
a self-fulfilling prophecy that delinquency occurs inevItably for youths from certain
backgrounds." Feld, Abolish. supra note 6. at 126.
70 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 46 (reporting Feld's conclusion that court dispositions are Irra-
tional because nothing is known about the effectiveness of particular treatment pro-
grams for particular children).
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4. Will Reform be Too Costly?
One critic adds an economic dimension to the list of con-
cems of uncertainty, suggesting that the attempt to employ
subjective measures of the need for treatment "hardly seems
worth the judicial burden and diversion of resources that the
effort would entail."7 2 Again, the argument is merely orna-
mental to a stated doubt on the value of rehabilitation efforts.
If treatment is effective, who is to say that the immeasurable
gain is offset by concern for the burdens of the judiciary? It
would be a burden no greater or worse than from any other
judicial step taken in the pursuit of justice. Moreover, the
cost criterion is an inappropriate part of the discussion with-
out imagining the cost and benefit of the imagined alternative
of criminal court confinement of children.73
5. Will Reform Result in Unfair Process?
Finally, critics of the modem juvenile court have fre-
quently speculated that the infusion of due process into the
system invites punitive dispositions, displacing the rehabili-
tative mission of the court. A correlated concept also Is ad-
vanced, namely that a faithful use of rehabilitative disposi-
tions will sacrifice the child's right to fair process.7 5 Although
these observations have often been made, they can only be
regarded as mere assumptions, and not as a report of find-
ings. They are also speculative pre-judgments on the worth
and attainability of well-conceived reforms that have been re-
viewed in this article and elsewhere.
The roots of these assumptions evidently lie in the mis-
taken notion that the rehabilitative effort, under the equity
banner of parens patriae, is a demonstration of raw court
72 Feld, Abolish, supra note 6, at 122; see also id. at 127 (noting that resources
are saved in eliminating questions on transfer of cases to adult court).
73 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing special facilities imagined
for children sentenced in adult courts); see also Conward, supra note 50, at 71-72
(describing studies comparing the economic value of punishment approaches and
the immensely superior economic prospects in prevention programs).
74 See Feld, Abolish, supra note 6, at 86-87. Judges, among others, have ex-
pressed this concept. See Klein, supra note 4, at 382 (describing the shift in the
court's philosophy -from rehabilitation to "punishment and incapacitation").
75 See Feld, Abolish, supra note 6, at 92 ("[J]udges will impose haphazard, une-
qual, and discriminatory punishment on similarly situated offenders without effec-
tive procedural or appellate checks."). This view merely demonstrates how the pres-
ent Is like the past, when founders of the juvenile court anticipated that its
benevolence would eliminate the need for procedural protections. See td. at 71-72
(discussing the court's former "individualized" approach to determining the best In-
terests of the child).
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power over individuals. 76 As such, the infusion of due process
limits that power and distorts the rehabilitative aim. This as-
sumption is incorrect because the rehabilitative approach
and parens patriae have a deeply-rooted protective dimension
as well, manifested as a discipline of the court to limit the
harm that may be inflicted on children.' Thus, as many
court scholars have noted, 8 efforts to rehabilitate serve a
purpose parallel to the extension of constitutional rights to
the child, and therefore the two should be compatible.
Finding such shortcomings in the rationale advanced for
discontinuing efforts to preserve and improve the juvenile
courts, we must next ask: Why are these courts so vigorously
condemned?
D. Are the Juvenile Courts an Arbitrary Target?
Observers of American jurisprudence would find it difficult
to discern why the juvenile courts in particular have been
identified from among the nation's equity courts as a target
for abolition. The explanation does not lie in a comparison of
the supposedly dangerous levels of judicial discretion. On
this score, juvenile courts are rivaled, for example, by the ju-
dicial bodies empowered to order involuntary hospitalization
for mental health treatment, which can be in some instances,
potentially interminable.sm The discretion of juvenile judges is
mired with limitations when compared with the almost total
discretion of a trial judge over the placement of a child of di-
vorced parents.81 Judges in delinquency cases also have
76 See supra note 19.
7 See id.
78 See AUSTIN & KRISBERG, supra note 50. at 183 (observing that a protective effort
is not advanced by secret or casual processes).
The blend of due process and rehabilitation is the unique consequence of fair
process on adolescent offenders. See Ainsworth. supra note 1. at 1119-21 (observing
that socialization of young offenders is dependent on fair court process): Melton. su-
pra note 23, at 181 (concluding that the juvenile courts contribute singularly to re-
habilitation by demonstrating fairness in the offering of due process, in spite of the
conclusion that treatment efforts are of doubtful value).
See Crippen. A Judge's Perspective. supra note 26 (expanding on this analysis
and stating the case for a juvenile court that offers children 'the best of both worlds.'
including solicitous care and treatment, and at least those protections afforded to
adults].
so See Lois A. Weithom, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis
of Skyrocketing Admission Rates. 40 STAN. L. REV. 773. 783-98 (1988) (exploring the
process, with and without court hearings, that continues to e.xplain the overwhelm-
in volume of juvenile placements).
I In this judicial activity, only one state, West Virginia. states a notable standard
of law on the topic; in most states, the occasion for an appellate correction of a
placement on a standard of law is almost non-exlstenL Gary Crippen. Stumbling Be-
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identical powers that are no less dangerous in child protec-
tion proceedings. Does the explanation for this targeting of
juvenile justice relate to the consequences of its errors?
Probably not, considering that the effects of court jurisdiction
over children and adults in hospitalization, child protection,
and divorce proceedings can in many instances be similar or
even worse.
Although it is speculative to explain the emergence of lit-
erature that proposes abolition of juvenile justice as we know
it, the occurrence may be due to mere expediency. As we
have seen here for example, there is an evident, albeit un-
worthy, alternative to the court of equity-juvenile offenders
seemingly could be prosecuted in the criminal courts. Nev-
ertheless, the explanation for the proposal might be in simply
recognizing that the thesis is uniquely provocative and thus a
natural magnet for a publication-driven academic world.
E. The Plan
Finally, those who would destroy the juvenile courts have
taken the logical step of offering an alternative, although they
usually address the topic fleetingly. As already suggested,
the plan is as flawed as the need. The proposal is to abolish,
and it basically calls for prosecuting all adolescent offenders
in the adult criminal courts. 82 Notwithstanding its proposi-
tion, there has been no demonstration that the criminal
courts can deliver justice to children.83
Some who suggest abolishing the juvenile courts have
made no reference to the criminal court alternative or have
stated unwarranted assumptions about its characteristics.8
Ironically, a primary proponent of criminal court jurisdiction
faults critics of his position because few of them "even at-
tempt any longer to defend the institution on its own merits,
but only to justify it by comparison with criminal courts,
which they contend are worse. " ' This juvenile court critic
contends only that the juvenile courts and criminal courts
yond Best Interests of the Child; Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting In the
Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75
MINN. L. REv. 427, 438 (1990) (discussing the "prescribed... primary caretaker
preference").
82 See generally Feld, Abolish, supra note 6, at 91.
See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 173-74 (analyzing the perils In criminal courts
that dampen concerns for problems of the juvenile courts).
84 See, e.g., Federle, supra note 5, at 49-50 (stating unexplained assumptions
about the quality of justice in the criminal justice system).
85 Feld, Abolish, supra note 6, at 96.
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are "equally" deficient.8 Yet he offers an adult court sen-
tencing proposal with the express premise that he does "not
propose simultaneously to completely reform the criminal
justice system.
" 7
Thus, as abolition is proposed, its advocates evidently
suggest employing one imperfect system rather than another.
Taking into account the current unwillingness of the anti-
conservationists to examine the criminal court alternative, it
is evident that the case for abolition is premature and criti-
cally incomplete. The problems of the criminal court plan are
strikingly revealed by clarifying a central but often-overlooked
characteristic of the proposal to abolish the juvenile courts.
It follows from the notion of abolition that critics are no
longer looking at a proposal to transfer jurisdiction for a class
of cases, but rather are formulating a plan for all cases. Over
80% of the juvenile court caseload involves accusations of
misdemeanor and status offenses. Thus, we will not under-
stand the workings of the criminal court by merely examining
its handling of felony cases, but rather instead by looking at
its operations in dealing with a massive caseload of misde-
meanor offenses.
This facet of the abolition proposal has major implications
for the consideration of control of waivers, provision of coun-
sel, and guarantee of other constitutional rights in the mis-
demeanor courts. Thus, an abolitionist's hope that juveniles
"get the same caliber of legal counsel, operating under the
same standards of zealous advocacy, as adult defendants re-
ceive" becomes problematic.' Abolitionists expect improved
justice from misdemeanor courts that are common forums for
group advisories dealing summarily with topics unknown to
children.' There is no evidence that competent counsel is
common-place in these courts or for appeals from their deci-
sions.
The misdemeanor and status offense caseload also
prompts alarm about criminal court sentencing practices. In
adult courts, children charged with these offenses would
normally face the prospect of 90 days confinement, somewhat




See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
Ainsworth, supra note 1. at 1130; see Federle. supra note 5. at 49 (suggesting
that "elimination of the juvenile system will guarantee that those charged with vio-
lating the law will receive the full panoply of protections both constitutional and
statutory").
See generaffy Rosenberg. supra note 3. at 166. 171-74.
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nent of this jurisdiction.9 The question then becomes: what
facilities will be employed?' In addition, how do proponents
of a punishment scheme expect to cope with the consistently
alarming evidence on the rate of recidivism of children fol-
lowing experiences in confinement?93 Furthermore, given the
threat of punitive confinement, what dispositions can be ex-
pected through plea bargains and a stay of punishment?'
None of these questions have been explored to date.
The specter of criminal court dealings with minor adoles-
cent offenses has prompted one proponent of the practice to
assert that the caseload will be reduced, by diversion of cases
and decriminalization of offenses, due to insights on the
problem by prosecutors and legislators. 95 This contention is
unwarranted in light of historic difficulties in gaining support
for diminished public scrutiny of adolescent misconduct. 0
Moreover, if the cases are treated in an alternative fashion,
such as in child protection proceedings, they will face the
same type of juvenile court problems deplored by abolition
proponents and confronted by those who would continue to
reform the juvenile courts."7
VI. STAYING THE COURSE FOR A HELPFUL COURT
Most of the 193 countries of the world that are recognized
by the United Nations, excepting only the United States and
Somalia, a country which has no functioning government, are
committed to the following," as well as other propositions of
the international convention on the rights of the child: "In all
91 See supra note 65.
See supra note 71.
93 See supra note 56.
94 See Crippen, A Judge's Perspective, supra note 26 (expanding on the issues for
accused adolescent misdemeanants); see also Id. (discussing issues regarding abu-
sive sentencing practices for adult felons).
95 See Feld, Abolish, supra note 6. at 128-29 (predicting confidently that these of-
ficials, facing the problem of scarce resources, "would" divert or decriminalize to con-
centrate on offenses that are "escalated in severity").
Feld has acknowledged the propensity of the American law enforcement system
to avoid decriminalization. See Feld, Transformation, supra note 47, at 700 (dis-
cussing juvenile courts' resistance to "Jurisdictional divestiture" that could lead to
"further convergence with criminal courts"); see also ALLEN, supra note 16, at 3-4
(describing an explosion of criminalization in the 20th Century, including the fact
that half of Chicago arrests in 1912 were for offenses not yet on the books 25 years
earlier, and estimating a doubling of chargeable offenses from 1900 to 1957).
97 See Crippen, A Judge's Perspective, supra note 26 (discussing alternative fo-
rums for minor delinquency and status offense cases).
98 See Huy S. Pham, U.S. Must Join World in Backing Convention on Rights of the
Child, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct. 4, 1998, at A25.
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actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administra-
tive authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration."'
The inaction of our federal government on this declaration
coincides with a failure of most lawmaking bodies in this
country to positively state a definitive, supportive public pol-
icy on the welfare of our children. Notwithstanding these
failures, our states have uniformly advanced a policy to pro-
tect the interests of adolescent offenders in juvenile courts,
leading one of the century's most notable jurisprudential
voices to praise the development as the "greatest forward step
in Anglo-American jurisprudence since Magna Charta."'Co
The task of the juvenile justice system, singularly, is the
prevention of public peril by helping children- identifying
their best interests- early in the course of their experiences
that may include public offenses.' This mission can be most
aptly achieved, considering that the bulk of juvenile justice
activity involves non-felony level ofenses.'"
It is shameful, rivaling the nation's problems in failing to
declare a policy to serve the interests of children, that agents
of the juvenile court have often abused their trust, most cer-
tainly harming the objects of their beneficence. It is also
equally shameful at this point, that some have even consid-
ered abandoning our most notable endeavor to uphold chil-
dren's interests- at least so long as positive, effective reforms
99 U.N. CONVENION ON THE RIGHTS OFTHE CHILD art. 3. para. 1.
'oo Alexander. supra note 30. at 353 (quoting Roscoe Pound In 1951). Signifi-
cantly, while critics might wish otherwise, this considered opinion of Dean Pound did
not occur prior to the surfacing of major critical analysis of the juvenile courts. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
'o' See Edward Humes, Tough Justice for Juveniles, N.Y. TMIES. May 29. 1996. at
Al, quoted in Kathleen A. Strottman, Creating a Downward Splrar Transfer Statutes
and Rebuttable Presumptions as Answers to Juvenile Delinquency. 19 WHrTTIER L
REV. 707, 755 (1998).
We can keep tinkering with laws so we can ship more and younger children to
adult court, but this does nothing to return juvenile courts to their original
mission: to deal with young people before they become hardened criminals.
The right questions in the debate about youth and crime are: How do we save
first-time offenders from lives of crime? How do we turn the best of our legal
profession toward saving children? Only when we deal with these issues will
we start to "crack down" on juvenile crime. Along the way. we just might find
that the notion of treating children differently from adults, simply because
they are children, is not so outdated after all.
Id. Colorfully, Denver's early juvenile judge. Ben Lindsey. told police that his job was
to save boys and not bicycles, so that -'we can save bicycles in the future that we
could not save in the past." LINDSEY & O'HIGGINS. supra note 15. at 144.
'w See supra p. 157 and note 60 and accompanying text.
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of the enterprise remain to be adopted, employed, and evalu-
ated. Although the proposals made to date for abolishing the
juvenile courts may reflect sincerely held commitments to the
interests of children, at this stage of the discussion they can
be considered no more than premature at best, as they are
evidently still wanting for a sound rationale.
